Abstract. Our goal is to use a theorem prover in order to verify invariance properties of distributed systems in a \model checking like" manner. A system S is described by a set of sequential components, each one given by a transition relation and a predicate Init de ning the set of initial states. In order to verify that P is an invariant of S, we try to compute, in a model checking like manner, the weakest predicate P 0 stronger than P and weaker than Init which is an inductive invariant, that is, whenever P 0 is true in some state, then P 0 remains true after the execution of any possible transition. The fact that P is an invariant can be expressed by a set of predicates (having no more quanti ers than P ) on the set of program variables, one for every possible transition of the system. In order to prove these predicates, we use either automatic or assisted theorem proving depending on their nature. We show in this paper how this can be done in an e cient way using the Prototype Veri cation System PVS. A tool implementing this veri cation method is presented.
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Introduction
Using a theorem prover to do model checking is not a new idea 2 . Theorem proving has been used successfully for the veri cation of temporal logic formulas on programs, specially systems like BM88], OSR93a] 3 , GM93] and CCF + 95].
In most of these approaches, it is mainly emphasized how to de ne the syntax of a speci cation formalism and its semantics (in terms of sets of computations) as well as the satisfaction of temporal logic formulas on computations. Then, a system S satis es a property f if every computation of S satis es f. In general, not much is told about how to verify the obtained formulas.
RSS95] explains how model checking (for nite state systems) is implemented in PVS as a tactic (which consists in transforming the model checking problem into a decidable -calculus formula and to run a decision procedure on this formula). In RSS95], DF95] and HS96] model checking is used to prove abstract descriptions of systems, while \ordinary" theorem proving is used to show the correctness of this abstract description with respect to a more concrete (in general in nite state) description. In Hun93] it is proposed to verify the correctness of each component using model checking, and then to deduce the correctness of the composed system by means of compositional rules embedded as inference rules in a theorem prover. BGMW94] describes an integration of the PVS theorem prover in an environment for the veri cation of hardware speci cation. It is used for discharging veri cation conditions expressing the fact that a specication simulates another.
Our approach
Our intention is not to verify arbitrary temporal logic formulas, but particular formula schematas corresponding to useful property classes. In order to prove that a system S satis es a property expressed by a temporal formula f, we do not use its semantics, but a proof rule generating a set of rst order logic formulas (without temporal modalities and without new quanti ers) such that their validity is su cient to prove that S satis es f. Here, we mention only safety properties expressible by formulas of the form \2P" (invariants) or \2(P ) P 1 W P 2 )", where P; P 1 ; P 2 are predicates 4 .
For example, in order to prove that P is an invariant of S (S j= 2P) | where S is de ned by a set T of transitions and a predicate Init de ning the set of initial states | it is necessary and su cient to nd a predicate P 0 weaker than Init and stronger than P which is an inductive invariant, that is P 0 is preserved by any computational step of S, i.e P 0 ) g pre ](P 0 ) 5 is valid for each transition of T. Model checking consists in computing iteratively the weakest predicate satisfying the implication Q ) g pre T](Q) starting with Q 0 = P and taking Q i+1 = Q i^g pre T](Q i ) that is by strengthening the proposed solution at each step. This method can be completely automatized under the condition that the above predicates are decidable. However, in the case of in nite state systems convergence is not guaranteed, and in real life systems with this very simple tactic, convergence is too slow, anyway. Convergence can be accelerated by replacing the predicate transformers g pre ] by some (lower) approximation or by using structural invariants (see Section 4.3) extracted from the program obtained by constant propagation, variable domain information, etc. Theorem proving (or an appropriate decision procedure) is used for establishing Q i ) Q i+1 that is for verifying that a xed point has been reached.
Related work
Tools like STeP MAB + 94], TPVS BLUP94] and CAVEAT GR95] use this technique. In CAVEAT systematic strengthening of invariants is not foreseen. STeP provides a lot of automatization and implements most of the rules presented in MP95].
In HS96], a new strengthening method has been proposed, in order to avoid the fast growth of the formulas due to the systematic strengthening: suppose that Q i is not inductive for some transition , that is, the proof of the goal Q i ) g pre ](Q i ) does not reduce to true but to some formula R. Then, instead of checking in the next step the formula Q i+1 = Q i^g pre ](Q i ), it is proposed to check R (which is often simpler) for invariance. However, this method does not accelerate convergence. This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we recall some general ideas concerning theorem proving and give a small overview on PVS. In Section 3, it is explained how to de ne our method completely within PVS and also, why we have abandoned this approach. Finally, in Section 4, we give a short presentation of our tool which acts like an interface with PVS. In Section 5, we demonstrate our method and tool on two examples: a nite state program implementing a mutual exclusion algorithm, and an in nite state program implementing a simple bu er using lists as data type.
The theorem proving paradigm
Theorem proving is the paradigm of developing and verifying mechanically mathematical proofs. The speci cation languages used (higher order logic) allow to de ne usual mathematical objects such as sets, functions, propositions and even proofs 6 , and can be generally understood as a mixture of predicate calculus, recursive de nitions a la ML and inductively de ned types. These languages are strong enough to model systems and express properties on them. Theorem provers provide an interactive environment for developing mathematical proofs using a set of tactics (elementary proof steps) and tacticals (combination of tactics). Possible tactics are implementations of either a deduction rule, rewriting rule, induction scheme or a decision procedure.
PVS
PVS is an environment for writing speci cations and developing proofs. It consists of a speci cation language integrated with a powerful and highly interactive theorem prover. PVS uses higher order logic as a speci cation language, the type system of PVS includes uninterpreted types, sub-typing and recursively de ned data-types. Four \sorts" characterize this language: Theory, Type, Expression (term), Formula (proposition). Any PVS speci cation is structured into parameterized theories. A Theory is a set of Type, variable, constant, function and Formula declarations. The PVS theorem prover implements a set of powerful tactics with a mechanism for composing them into proof tacticals. The tactics available are combinations of deduction rules and decision procedures. Some of these tactics such as assert and bddsimp invoke e cient decision procedures for arithmetic and boolean expressions. PVS has emacs as user interface.
3 Speci cation and veri cation within PVS One of the drawbacks when using theorem provers is the tedious encoding of semantics and writing of speci cations. In Coq CCF + 95], grammar extension is allowed which makes speci cations easier to write and to read.
In PVS, this technique can be generalized to allow user-de ned speci cation syntax (e.g. Sa 95]). The de ned speci cation syntax can be a combination of the PVS speci cation syntax and user speci cation syntax since it can be constructed using non-terminals of the PVS grammar.
To prove that a predicate is an invariant of a system is usually done by embedding the semantics of transition systems and the notion of invariance of a property in the speci cation language of a theorem prover. In PVS, this can be done by means of the following de nitions: The PVS theory named Program is parameterized by the type State de ning the tuple type of the state vector, that means, its i th component de nes the type of the i th state variable. System is given as list of actions, where Action is de ned as a record type with two elds, a guard and an assignment. guard is the condition under which the given action is activated. assignments is a tuple of type State representing the new value of the state vector after the execution of the given action. The predicate is-inductive? taking as arguments a system S and a predicate P, yields the result true if P is an inductive invariant of S.
In order to show that P is an invariant of S, we have to prove the following obligation:
prove-invariant : OBLIGATION EXISTS (P':PRED State]):
(FORALL (t: State) : (P'(t) => P(t)) AND is-inductive?(S,P'))
This proof obligation does not tell us how to nd a satisfactory predicate P'. This is the reason why we use the iterative computation described in Section 1.1 which replaces the above (second order) obligation by an (in nite) suite of rst order obligations such that the proof of any obligation of this suites validates the initial obligation. But we found that such an embedding of the semantics of transition systems directly in PVS is still not satisfactory for the veri cation of large systems. Writing programs is tedious, proofs are very slow since much time is lost in expanding the de nitions of is-inductive?, WPC-System and WPC-Action. We also found that we cannot perform static analysis on programs written in this way.
Therefore, we prefered to describe programs in a more natural way and not to translate them into a PVS theory, but just to generate automatically proof obligations equivalent to is-inductive?(S,P') and to submit them to the PVS proof checker.
4 A veri cation tool Figure 1 shows the architecture of our tool for computer-aided veri cation. We rst present how systems are described in this tool and how the veri cation process works. We also show how both speci cation and veri cation are connected with the PVS system.
A speci cation formalism
In our tool, systems are discribed in a formalism close to Dijkstra's language of guarded commands. In fact, a system is de ned as a set of components where each component is given by a set of transitions de ning conditional data transformations, where program variables are of any data type de nable in PVS and allowed value expressions are any expressions de nable in PVS. The grammar de ning this speci cation formalism is the following 7 : system ) id system PARAMETER This grammar uses some non-terminals of the grammar of the PVS speci cation language 8 . This allows to type check easily all PVS declarations and expressions by invoking the PVS parser and type checker. There are additional type correctness conditions for actions which have the form of invariants. For example, an action of the form guard ---> x:= x-1, 8 The non-terminals of the form h pvs i where x is declared as natural number, is type correct if guard ) x > 0 is a valid formula; but it is su cient that guard ) x > 0 is an invariant of the whole system under consideration.
A proof methodology
We implemented some of the veri cation rules presented in MP95] such as the Inv rule and the Waiting rule corresponding respectively to the proof of properties of the form 2P and 2(P ) P 1 W P 2 ), where P; P 1 and P 2 are predicates. Veri cation conditions are extracted automatically from the considered specication S and the property we want to verify by a proof obligation or veri cation condition (VC) generator. The VCs generated for the Inv rule are respectively Init ) Q i and fQ i ) g pre ](Q i ) j 2 Tg where Init is the predicate de ning the set of initial states, T the set of transitions of S and Q i de ned as in Section 1.1. We start with i = 0 and increase it until a provable set of veri cation conditions is obtained or Init ) Q i is not provable anymore (a counter example for this obligation proves that P is not an invariant of S).
The VC generator generates only VCs which are not \trivially true". For example, if an action does not a ect the variables occurring in Q i , then the VC \Q i ) g pre ](Q i )" is not generated. If Q i is of the form \(pc = i) ) Q", where pc a control variable and i a possible value, it is only necessary to prove that Q i is preserved by every action leading to control point i. In fact, it is often the case that predicates of the form g pre ](Q i ) are of the form (pc = i) ) Q.
Also, the auxiliary invariants (see Section 4.3) are of this form.
The generated obligations are submitted to the PVS proof checker, which tries to prove their validity by means of a set of tacticals we have de ned. First an e cient but incomplete tactical for rst order predicates is used. It combines rewriting with boolean simpli cation using Bdds 9 and an arithmetic decision procedure: after rewriting all de nitions, the Bdd procedure breaks formulas into elementary ones, where other decision procedures such as arithmetic ones can be applied. If the proof fails, another tactical combining automatic induction and decision procedures is applied. If the proof fails again, a set of non-reducible goals is returned and one iteration step is performed. The user can always suspend this process and try to prove the unproved obligation in an interactive manner using the PVS proof checker.
Use of auxiliary invariants
It is in general essential to use already proved invariants or systematically generated structural invariants obtained by static analysis ( MAB + 94], BBM95], MP95] and BLS96]). Let I stand for the conjunction of all these invariants. In order to prove that P is inductive, it is su cient to prove I^P ) g pre ](P) ( ) instead of P ) g pre ](P). As I is usually a huge formula, we have to use it in an e cient way, that is only its \relevant conjuncts". Invariants of the particular form (pc = i) ) Q, providing information about values of variable at some control point i, are only relevant for (*) when starts at control point i. In Gri96], a more re ned strategy is de ned which selects in a formula of the form h 1^h1 ^h n ) c, formulas h i which are relevant for establishing the validity of c.
An e cient implementation
The implementation language of PVS is Lisp. Theories, expressions and formulas are de ned as Lisp classes. In our tool, programs are also de ned as Lisp classes. Type checking a program creates a class containing the corresponding declarations and actions. A current list of type checked programs is maintained. Static analysis described in Section 4.3 is performed using the internal representation of programs. The fact that our internal structures are very close to the internal PVS representation, allows to use many PVS features.
Examples
We present two examples. The rst one, which is nite state, is a mutual exclusion algorithm studied in Sif79]. We want to verify that the predicate P = (p1 = 2) ) ((p2 = 2) ) (ina _ inb)) expressing the impossibility that both processes may enter the critical section (pi =5) at the same moment, is an invariant for this program 10 . Since Q 0 = P is not inductive for the transitions t15 leading to p1 = 2 and t25 leading to p2 = 2, the predicate Q 1 = P^g pre t15](P)^g pre t25](P) is calculated: Q 1 = (p1 = 2 ) (p2 = 2 ) (ina _ inb))) (p1 = 3^PAB ) (p2 = 2 ) (ina _ inb))) (p2 = 3^:PAB ) (p1 = 2 ) (ina _ inb))) Q 1 ) g pre ](Q 1 ) is a valid formula for all transitions leading to pi = 2 or pi = 3 and the proof of this fact succeeds using our tactical. In this example, iteration is not necessary when using the following structural invariant obtained by an extension of the method described in BLS96]:
The proof of Q 0^I ) g pre ](Q 0 ) succeeds also for the transitions = t15 and = t25. This example was treated automatically by our tool.
The second example, which is in nite state, describes a simple bu er with two actions \input" and \output". The variable e represents the input of the the bu er. The imported PVS theory Buffer that contains the de nition of bu ers and some basic functions operating on them, is de ned as follows: is an invariant. It expresses the fact that elements leave the bu er in the same order they have entered it, that is, the FIFO property. The following VCs are generated by our tool using the Waiting rule:
VC-1 : OBLIGATION isbefore(x,y,f) => isbefore(x,y,cons(e,f)) OR (outp=x) VC-2 : OBLIGATION isbefore(x,y,f) AND NOT(null?(f)) => isbefore(x,y,tail(f)) OR (first(f)=x) VC-3 : OBLIGATION NOT(null?(f)) AND (x=car(f)) AND NOT(isin(f,y)) AND NOT(x=y) => isbefore(x,y,f) OR (outp=x)
The obligations VC-1 and VC-3 are proved automatically in one single step proof using our tactical. VC-2 is proved automatically with the same tactical using Buffer-lemma, which expresses a trivial property of bu ers. That means the property can be veri ed without iteration.
Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have presented a method and a tool allowing to do model checking using a theorem prover. Our approach takes advantage of the automatizability of algorithmic model checking and of the power of axiomatic methods which allows to deal with in nite state programs. It is clearly only a partial method as the xed point may never be reached by the algorithmic method. Sometimes, the user will be able to guess a solution (which often can be checked easily).
In this paper we have hardly mentioned compositionality; however, for example for the veri cation of the mutual exclusion program (consisting of the parallel composition of two components) no product is built; also the method deriving structural invariants BLS96] is compositional. In the future, more compositionality will by added by means of well-known rules.
Another interesting direction is the use of abstraction in the manner proposed for example in Gra94]. The present framework is appropriate for this approach as in the above mentioned paper, the most di cult part was to argue that the considered abstract operations are in fact abstractions of the concrete operations. Here, all the necessary proofs can be done with PVS. Similar proposals have been made in DF95] or in HS96].
